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Warren: Immunity and the Grand Jury

IMMUNITY AND THE GRAND JURY
INTRODUCTION
There have been many immunity statutes and many
cases, on both the federal and state level,' which have dealt
with the concept of immunity as related to the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.'
These statutes
and case decisions have revolved around one basic issue:
When a person is compelled to testify before a grand jury
after being granted "immunity", does the law require that
he be immune from prosecution, or merely that the compelled
testimony not be used in the prosecution ? The bulk of case
law arises in the federal jurisdiction and in those states where
serious crimes must be prosecuted by indictment. This article
will emphasize the effect of a recent United States Supreme
Court ruling on immunity in the grand jury system in general,
with special emphasis on the Wyoming grand jury system.
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE GRAND JURY SYSTEMI

The fifth amendment provides: "No person shall be held
to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime unless
on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury ..... " Federal
Rule 7' requires that all federal offenses which carry a prison
term in excess of one year be prosecuted by indictment of a
grand jury (unless waived).
The historical functions of the grand jury have been to
sift evidence to determine whether a crime has been committed, and to provide a protective bulwark standing solidly
between the ordinary citizen and over zealous prosecutors
and policemen. In this aspect, its value in today's society has
been a much debated question.
States that no longer have much use for the grand jury4
have generally propounded three reasons for the shift to
1. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The court held that the same minimum
standards would determine the extent or scope of the privilege in state
and federal proceedings, because the same substantive guarantees of the
Bill of Rights is involved.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. FED. R. CraM. P. 7.
4. Although the Supreme Court has made the self-incrimination clause of the
fifth amendment applicable to states, it has declined to apply the grand
jury clause.
Copyrigh @ 1973 by the University of Wyoming
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information: (1) the grand jury acts as a rubber stamp for
the prosecuting attorney who can usually get an indictment
at will; (2) the grand jury often adds needless expense and
delay to the criminal process; and (3) the grand jury may
often only be a duplication of the preliminary hearing.'
Proponents of the grand jury view it as an investigative
body " ' acting independently of either prosecuting attorney
or judge,' . . . (Citation omitted) whose mission is to clear
the innocent, no less than to bring to trial the guilty."' In
United States v. Dionisio, the court felt that if the grand
jury is to properly perform, "[I]t must be free to pursue
its investigation unhindered by external influence or supervision so long as it does not trench upon the legitimate rights
of any witness called before it."'
The problem is that many of a witness' legitimate rights
are trampled upon. Although the grand jury may be useful
for needed investigation, the grand jury witness must face
the questions of the prosecutor and grand juror without the
presence and protection of counsel Moreover, he may not
even be advised of the subject matter of the proceedings.
Without this protection, a witness may often make unnecessary admissions, or forget favorable facts. Furthermore, he
cannot explain or controvert facts on cross-examination.
Thus, if the grand jury is to be used, there must be available
the strong shield of transactional immunity to protect the vulnerable witness from the blows of injustice.
Because of these inequities in the grand jury system,
many responsible law enforcement officials believe that the
grand jury should be abolished in favor of the "preliminary
5.

HALL, KAMISAR, LAFAVE, & ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 791 (3rd

ed. 1969).
6. United States v. Dionisio-

-.....

U.S ...

,93

S. Ct. 764, 773 (1973).

7. Id.

8. A witness' claimed right to have counsel with him inside the grand jury
room has been repeatedly repudiated by the federal courts. In re Groban,
352 U.S. 330 (1957); Jones v. United States, 342 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
9. Foster, Grand Jury Practice in the 1970's, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 701, 716-17
(1971). Foster feels that prosecutors who claim that the grand jury system
is more likely to produce the truth are, in effect, implying that the adversary system should be abolished. This type of reasoning goes against the
grain 'of our present judiciary system which stresses that truth can best
be obtained when a proper foundation is laid and when adversary counsel
is present to object to improper implications, conclusions, and assumptions
of facts not in evidence.
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hearing" method of instituting criminal charges."0 Wyoming
has not abolished the grand jury, but it is one of twenty-two
states" where crimes may be prosecuted by either indictment
or information at the option of the prosecutor. 2 Furthermore,
the preliminary hearing has become the almost exclusive
means of instituting prosecution in Wyoming as the grand
jury option has fallen by the wayside.
THE PRIviLEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

The privilege against self-incrimination is one of our
nation's most cherished principles and is perhaps the mainstay of our adversary system." In this area, the Bill of
Rights has been subject to broad developments. The privilege
against self-incrimination is "as broad as the mischief against
which it seeks to guard,"' 4 and the courts of the United
States should not depart from such a noble heritage. In other
words, the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege
is the respect that a state or federal government must accord
to the dignity of its citizens. 5 But, like any other good rule,
the privilege does have its exceptions. As will be seen, however, the privilege should cease to apply only when the testimony sought cannot possibly be used as a basis for, or in aid
of, a criminal prosecution against the witness. The four general exceptions are as follows:
(1) the witness may waive the privilege ;6
10. Id.

11. See Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, U. ILL. L.F.
423, 424 n.6 (1966) for a listing of the various jurisdictions.
12. WYo. STAT. § 7-118 (1957) provides: "All crimes, misdemeanors and offenses may be prosecuted in the court having jurisdiction thereof, either
by indictment as hereinafter provided, or by information." This provision
was added by the legislature to allow an option since article 1, section 13,
of the Wyoming Constitution provides: "Until otherwise provided by law,
no person shall, for a felony, be proceeded against criminally, otherwise
than by indictment. . . ." It might be noted at this point that the legislature
also has the power to change, regulate, or abolish the grand jury system.
WYO. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
13. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
14. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966).
16. If a witness does not assert his privilege to each and every question asked
of him, an answer to any one question may be deemed to effect a complete
waiver of the privilege. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951);
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896); United States v. Seewald, 450 F.2d
1159 (2d Cir. 1971) ; Ellis v. United States, 416 F.2d 791 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
People v. Cassidy, 213 N.Y. 388, 107 N.E. 713 (1915).
Furthermore, prosecutors may avoid immunity problems by asking the
witness to sign a waiver of immunity before entering the grand jury room.
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(2) if the prosecution for a crime is barred by the statute
of limitations, the witness is compelled to answer;
(3) if the answer may tend to disgrace the witness, and
the proposed evidence is material to the issue on trial,
he may be compelled to answer, but if the answer can
have no effect upon the case, except as to impair the
witness' credibility the privilege is still in effect;
(4) if the witness has already received a pardon, he can
no longer use his privilege.1 7
This final exception is the one upon which the bulk of
this paper will be concerned.
TRANSACTIONAL IMMUNITY VERSUS TESTIMONIAL IMMUNITY

"The interdiction of the Fifth Amendment operates only
where a witness is asked to incriminate himself-in other
words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to
a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been
taken away, the Amendment ceases to apply.""
The main way in which criminality is taken away is by
an immunity statute. Immunity signifies the nonliability for
the offense itself; while privilege signifies the right not to
be compelled to speak about the offense. By an immunity the
offender's guilt ceases; under a privilege, it continues.e
There are two basic types of immunity statutes in use today.
One type may be called testimonial or immunity-from-use
statutes. They provide that the testimony which the witness
is compelled to disclose shall not afterwards be used against
him in a judicial proceeding. The other type may be called
But no person may be penalized for not signing the waiver for he is merely
asserting his constitutional rights of privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus, the Supreme Court has nullified the ouster of a public schoolteacher,
Slochower v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); repudiated the disbarment of an attorney, Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967); revoked the
suspension of a police officer, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) ;
overruled the removal from office of a public official, Perla v. New York,
392 U.S. 296 (1968) ; and rescinded the discharge of a public employee, Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass'n, Inc. v. Comm'r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280
(1968), where the individuals were disciplined merely because they invoked
their privilege against self-incrimination or refused to waive an investigation.
17. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 599 (1896).
18. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 67 (1906).
19. 8 WtGMom, EviE:NCu § 2281 (McNaugton rev. 1961).
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transactional or immunity-from-prosecution statutes. They
provide that the witness may not be prosecuted or subject to
any penalty for the transaction about which he testified.2"
The immunity given under both types of statutes extends
only to prosecution for past crimes, and not to prosecution
for future crimes or for perjury or contempt in connection
with the making of the disclosure itself.21 Wyoming has
several immunity statutes; some providing for testimonial
immunity and some providing for transactional immunity.
Each statute affects only a particular crime or small group of
crimes, and the varied phraseology could lead to confusion.
Until recently there were numerous federal immunity statutes and courts continuously wrestled over which type of
immunity should be used. But in 1970, the United States
Congress passed one immunity statute to govern all areas,
and it is submitted that the United States Supreme Court
rested its hat on the wrong type of immunity.
HISTORY AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
FEDERAL IMMUNITY STATUTES

The first federal immunity statute was enacted in 18572"
to aid in the investigation of corrupt legislators. This statute conferred transactional immunity and the witnesses received their immunity from prosecution simply by testifying
before a congressional committee. Discussion of possible
abuses of transactional immunity induced Congress to withdraw the legislative pardon, and adopt a new immunity
20. Id.
21. Id. § 2282.
22. WYo. CONST. art. 3, § 44 (bribery of legislators-immunity from use);
WYo. STAT. § 1-415 (1957) (proceedings in aid of execution, tending to
convict of fraud-immunity from use in prosecution of fraud) ; WYo. STAT.
(gambling-immunity from use); WYo. STAT. § 6-212
§ 6-205 (1957)
(1957) (destruction of gambling devices-immunity from prosecutions);
WYo. STAT. § 22-360 (1957) (elections, corrupt practices-immunity from
use and from prosecution for any crime connected with the offense); Ch.
142, § 19 [1921] Wyo. Sess. Laws 218-37 (repealed 1967) (insurance
offenses-immunity from prosecution and use); WYO. STAT. § 27-33(J)
(1957) (unemployment compensation-immunity from prosecution); Wyo.
STAT. § 37-35 (1957) (public service commission-immunity from prosecution).
23. Act of Jan. 24, 1857, ch. 19, § 2, 11 Stat. 155. The statute provided:
[N]o person examined and testifying before either House of Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, shall be
held to answer criminally in any court of justice, or subject to
any penalty or forfeiture for any fact or act touching which he
shall be required to testify. ...
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statute in 1862.4 Under this statute it was only the testimony
itself which could not later be used in any criminal proceeding against the witness.2 5 A similar statute,2 6 which also provided only testimonial immunity was soon challenged in the
famous case of Counselman v. Hitchcock. 7 In Counselman
the witness was convicted of contempt of court when he refused, on the grounds of self-incrimination, to answer questions put to him during an investigation by a federal grand
jury concerning alleged violations of the Interstate Commerce
Act. The Supreme Court held: "[L] egislation cannot abridge
a constitutional privilege, and ... it cannot replace or supply
one, at least unless it is so broad as to have the same extent
in scope and effect.""s In other words, the immunity statute
must be "coextensive" with the Constitutional privilege before it will be upheld. The court felt that the statute in quesion was not coextensive because testimonial immunity "could
not prevent the obtaining and the use of witnesses and evidence which should be attributable directly to the testimony
he might give under compulsion, and on which he might be
convicted, when otherwise, and if he had refused to answer,
he could not possibly have been convicted."" Furthermore,
it "' 'affords no protection against that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of
the details of a crime, and of sources of information which
may supply other means of convicting the witness or party.""°
In short, the statute did not protect the witness from being
compelled to be a witness against himself.
24. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11, § 1, 12 Stat. 333. The statute provided: "[T]he
testimony of a witness examined and testifying before either House of
Congress, or any committee of either House of Congress, shall not be used
as evidence in any criminal proceeding against such witness, in any court
of justice. . . ." The fruits of such testimony were not immunized and
future prosecutions were not barred.
25. In 1892, the Supreme Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892), held that a similar immunity statute did not extend to other
matters to which the testimony might indirectly lead, i.e., the fruits of
such testimony.
26. Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15 Stat. 37. Act of Jan. 24, 1862, ch. 11,
§ 1, 12 Stat. 333, was never repealed, but was found to be constitutionally
inadequate because it did not provide for transactional immunity. Adams
V. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
27. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
28. Id. at 585.
29. Id. at 564.
30. Id. at 586.
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On the basis of the court's holding in Counselman, Congress enacted an immunity statute which granted absolute
immunity (transactional) from future prosecution." This
statute was sustained in Brown v. Walker3 in 1896. The court
in Brown based its opinion on the Counselman decision in that
the statute was coextensive with the privilege against selfincrimination 8 The effect of Brown was to create a settled
doctrine that the only coextensive immunity statute was of
the transactional type. The statute upheld in Brown subsequently became the model of numerous federal immunity
statutes thereafter adopted, and "has become part of our
constitutional fabric." 4 A Wyoming case, Miskimmins v.
Shaver, 5 also seemed to approve of the holding in Counselman, but went on to say that since Wyoming had no immunity
statutes36 only Wyoming's constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination 7 would apply in cases where the witness
is asked to give testimony. Therefore, a witness could not be
compelled to testify.
Anyone who doubted that transactional immunity was
the only type of immunity that was coextensive with the
fifth amendment privilege should have had those doubts resolved by the Supreme Court's opinion in Ullmann v. United
States in 1955." The Court reaffirmed the decision in Brown
which had involved an immunity statute quite similar to the
31. Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, § 1, 27 Stat. 443. This statute was in aid of
the Interstate Commerce Act investigations and provided:
But no person shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing,
concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its
subpoena, or the subpoena of either of them, or in any such case
or proceeding ...
32. 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
33. Id. at 594.
34. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956).
35. 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411 (1899).
36. Id. at 416, 58 P. at 418.
37. WYo. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
38. 350 U.S. 422 (1956).
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one in Ullman,"0 and also stated that the statute in Counselman had been constitutionally inadequate.
Thus from 1892 when Counselman was decided until 1964
there was no doubt that transactional immunity was a constitutional requirement. But in 1964, the case of Murphy v.
Waterfront Commission 1 was decided and a shadow was
placed on the security of transactional immunity by a cloud
that was never really present. In Murphy, the defendants
had refused to answer questions at a hearing before a state
waterfront commission. Although they had been granted
immunity from prosecution under state law, their refusal was
based on the ground that they might incriminate themselves
under federal law. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protected a state
witness in a proceeding under state law from subsequent
prosecution under both state and federal law, and that "testimonial" type immunity would be given to him by federal
courts.2 All this decision really did was to resolve conflicting
state and federal interests; a state interest in acquiring information and a federal interest in not beig precluded from
prosecuting violators of federal law. It certainly does not
follow that just because Murph'y aids federal-state relations
that the testimonial immunity will apply when only a single
jurisdiction is involved. Thus, Murphy did not hold that testimonial immunity would satisfy the fifth amendment privilege if the jurisdiction compelling incriminating information
39.

The statute involved in Ullmann provided:
But no witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or
forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is so compelled, after having claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence,
nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal
proceeding ...
Act of Aug. 20, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-600, § 1(c), 68 Stat. 746.
40. 350 U.S. 422, 436-37 (1956).
41. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
42. Id. at 79. In stating the rule, the court said:
[Wie hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may
not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating
under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits
cannot be used in any manner by federal officials in connection
with a criminal prosecution against him.
This is slightly different from the Counselman statute in that the
Counselman statute did not prevent the "fruits" from being used. See supra
note 26.
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only gave testimonial immunity, 3 but in fact, actually broadened the immunity concept by granting an immunity beyond
the jurisdiction.
To reinforce the fact that Counselman was not reversed
by Murphy, the Supreme Court, in 1965 held in Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Board4 4 that an adequate immunity statute must afford "absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates. '"" Thus, the Supreme Court as of this decision had not
yet moved away from the constitutional requirement of absolute immunity in single jurisdiction cases. Unfortunately,
Justice White's concurring opinion in Murphy seems to have
been read as the holding. He felt:
The Constitution does not require that immunity go
so far as to protect against all prosecutions to which
the testimony relates, including prosecutions of another government, whether or not there is any casual
connection between the disclosure and the prosecution or evidence offered at trial."8
He also felt that when only testimonial immunity is given
"[b]oth the Federal Government and the witness are in
exactly the same position as if the witness had remained
silent." 4 These statements were contrary to seventy-two
years of Supreme Court opinions and apparently this is the
opinion that the United States Legislature relied on in drafting the immunity provisions of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970.4
The new federal law repealed over fifty existing federal
immunity statutes,"9 and states that a witness who invokes
43. Mansfield, The Albertson Case: Conflict Between the Privilege Against
Sel/-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, 1966 Sup.
CT. R. 103, 165 (1966). If a witness is being asked questions about a state
violation only and the federal government is not concerned, the state should
still be required to give transactional immunity. The same would be true
if only the Federal government were involved. Furthermore, if a witness
is being asked questions at a state trial about an offense which may be
punishable at both the state and the federal levels, the state should still
be required to give transactional immunity, but the federal court may be
allowed to use testimonial immunity.
44. 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
45. Id. at 79-80.
46. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 106-07 (1964).
47. Id. at 101.
48. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 201, 84 Stat. 926 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05

(1970)).

49. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-05 (1970).
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his pTivilege against self-incrimination may not refuse to
testify if he is granted the immunity provided for by the
statute. The immunity provided is as follows:
[N]o testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other inf ormation) may be used against the witness in any
criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply
with the order. °
By not granting transactional immunity, this statute has
erased over seventy years of progressive development and
has all but returned to requirements that Counselman and
subsequent cases held were constitutionally inadequate. 1 The
legislature apparently misinterpreted Murphy to mean that
only testimonial immunity was required in single jurisdiction cases. Although this misinterpretation was indeed surprising, it was not nearly as surprising as the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Kastigar v. United States.2
. In Kastigar, the witnesses were subpoenaed to appear
before a United States grand jury, and since the Government
believed that the witnesses were likely to assert their privilege
against self-incrimination, it gave the witnesses testimonial
immunity pursuant to IS U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003. The witnesses
opposed the order claiming that the scope of immunity provided was not coextensive with the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Consequently the Court found the
witnesses in contempt.58 The Court, in upholding the contempt citations, held that mere testimonial immunity was
coextensive with the privilege and affirmed the constitutionality of the new Federal statute. The Court felt that its
decision was consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman since the statute in Counselman was found to be unconstitutional because it "failed to protect a witness from future
prosecution based on knowledge and sources of information
50. Id. § 6002.
51. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1970) with Act of Feb. 25, 1868, ch. 13, § 1, 15
Stat. 37. It will be remembered that the Counselman statute (Act of Feb.
25, 1868) did not prevent the fruits from being used, however.
52

-.....U.S . ----..
, 92 S.Ct. 1653

(1972).

53, The contempt order was issued pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1826 (1970).
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obtained from the compelled testimony," 5 4 whereas 18 U.S.C.
6002 prevents indirect information from being used. But the
Court did not give full weight to the rest of the Counselman
opinion which stated, "[A] statutory enactment, to be
valid, must afford absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." 5 The
Court then went on to state that the testimonial immunity
approved in Murph'y did not relate to single jurisdiction
cases, but nevertheless the reasoning in Murphy compelled the
conclusion that testimonial immunity was sufficient to compel
testimony over the claim of the privilege even if only a
single jurisdiction were involved. This is certainly expanding Murphy beyond its facts and the reasons for such an expansion are quite impractical. The Court felt that testimonial
immunity "provides a comprehensive safeguard, barring the
use of compelled testimony as an 'investigatory lead'. . . .,11
Furthermore, the Court stated that a person accorded testimonial immunity is not dependent upon the good faith and
integrity of the prosecuting authorities for the preservation
of his Constitutional rights since "the federal authorities
have the burden of showing that their evidence is not tainted
by establishing that they had an independent, legitimate
source for the disputed evidence.""5 The Court then made an
analogy between compelled testimony and coerced confessions.
Its logic was that since a coerced confession was excluded as
evidence in a prosecuion suit, so should compelled testimony
be excluded in a prosecution suit. 9 In other words, the immunity that was constitutionally required was reduced to a
mere exclusion. Unfortunately, on that same fateful day, the
Court, in a companion case entitled Zicarelli v. New Jersey
0 reached the same conState Commission of Investigation,"
clusions in assessing the constitutionality of a state statute
providing for only testimonial immunity.
The reasoning of the Court has several basic flaws. The
first is that the Court majority fails to face reality. As Mr.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60

92 S.Ct. 1653, 1661-62 (1972).
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892).
92 S.Ct. 1653, 1663-64 (1972).
Id. at 1664-65.
Id. at 1665.
Id.
,92 S.Ct. 1670 (1972).
U.S- ------.
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Justice Marshall pointed out in the dissenting opinion, it is
indeed futile to expect that a ban on any information derived
directly or indirectly from compelled testmony can be enforced. The only safeguard of the witness' rights is the good
faith of the prosecuting authorities. Even if one concedes
that all prosecuting authorities act in good faith, their good
faith alone does not provide a sufficient safeguard.
For the paths of information through the investigative bureaucracy may well be long and winding, and
even a prosecutor acting in the best of faith cannot
be certain that somewhere in the depths of his investigative apparatus, often including hundreds of
employees, there was not some prohibited use of the
compelled testimony. . . . (Citations omitted) The
Court today sets out a loose net to trap tainted evidence and prevent its use against the witness, but it
accepts an intolerably great risk that tainted evidence
will in fact slip through that net."'
Thus, when the prosecution is allowed to offer only
testimonial immunity, it is given much more than is taken
away. For while the witness has given up his constitutional
right of silence, all the prosecution has given up is an unenforceable rule that will not give immunity, but a mere exclusion. As Mr. Justice Marshall put it, "[T]he Court turns
reason on its head when it compares a statutory grant of immunity to the 'immunity' that is inadvertently conferred by an
unconstitutional interrogation."" There is really no comparison between the two because the evidence obtained through
coercive confessions and illegal searches is excluded at trial
because the use of such evidence is prohibited by the Constitution. Exclusionary rules fail to offer a full and adequate
remedy in two respects: the accused is inadequately protected
from illegal police conduct, and the police are deterred from
continuing in such conduct only insofar as the must forego
use of the fruits of the illegal conduct. Exclusionary rules
have a retroactive effect in that they attempt to cure a past
wrong, while an immunity statute attempts to prevent a future
wrong. Consequently, immunity statutes should be judged
61. Kastigar v. United States,
(Marshall concurring).
62. Id.

____ U.S..

. , 92 S.Ct. 1663, 1669 (1972)
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by stricter standards than exclusionary rules. While it may
be true that granting transactional immunity for a policeman's error in conducting an illegal interrogation or search
might be too high of a price to pay; it is certainly not Irue
in the case of compulsory testimony. In the latter, the prosecuting officials have a valid choice-either to "compel [the]
testimony and suffer the resulting ban on prosecution or to
forego the testimony.'""
CONSEQUENCES ON WYOMING GRAND JuRIES

In the past, the grand jury has played a minimal role
in Wyoming's judicial process. As noted previously, Wyoming prosecutors can choose between indictment by grand
jury and information in pursuing prosecutions."4 In addition
to prohibitive cost, unnecessary duplication of the preliminary
hearing, and the "rubber stamp" notion,6 5 there is one additional factor that has kept prosecutors in Wyoming from using
the grand jury. While other state and federal prosecutors
have been able to use the grand jury system as a means of
obtaining valuable prosecuting information, Wyoming prosecutors have not had much of a chance to do this."6
Unlike the Federal Government, Wyoming does not have
a single immunity statute which provides for immunity from
compelled testimony in any criminal case. Instead there are
several inconsistent statutes which affect only a few infrequently committed crimes. The practical significane of this
difference is that immunity in Wyoming is almost unknown
and thus, most witnesses can still claim their Constitutionally
protected right against self-incrimination. As Justice Corn
stated in Miskimmiis v. Shaver:
There are also statutes of the United States and many
of the states providing that evidence thus elicited
shall not be used against the witness in any prosecution against him, or that he shall not be prosecuted
for any matter concerning which he may testify...
and [since] we have no statute attempting to confer
immunity upon a witness... we have only the consti63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 1670.
WYo. STAT. § 7-118 (1957).
See Introduction supra.
See note 22 supra,
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tutional privilege itself to consider as applied to
the facts of the case.... 67
This means that immunity can not be granted without statutory authority, and when when statutory immunity is lacking, the witness does not need to waive his fifth amendment
rights. Consequently, the only crimes in which a witness may
be compelled to testify by granting him immunity are in
those few narrow crimes listed in the statutes. Without the
possibility of getting a witness to talk, the possibility of gaining information about crimes is greatly reduced. Perhaps
this lack of comprehensive immunity statute is the safest
route to follow as far as protecting individual rights is concerned. For as long as there are no additions to the list of
immunity statutes, there can be no added deprivations of
constitutional rights by way of testimonial immunity. However, this might not be the most satisfactory approach. As
previously discussed, a grand jury can serve a very useful
purpose. As long as certain procedural safeguards are followed, the grand jury can obtain needed information without
resorting to undesirable police conduct such as illegal search
and seizure and illegal wiretapping. The procedural safeguard that shoud be of foremost importance is transactional
immunity. By having a comprehensive transactional immunity statute, Wyoming can live in the best of both worlds.
The state can receive information needed in crime prevention
and detection, and the citizen will retain his right against
self-incrimination through a truly "coextensive" statute.
CONCLUSION

For over seventy years both the legislation and the cases
adjudicated have, for the most part, agreed that only transactional immunity was coextensive with the privilege against
self-incrimination. Many statutes were declared unconstitutional and many prisoners were freed of contempt charges
because Congressmen and judges alike knew that testimonial
immunity did not grant witnesses the absolute immunity
from prosecution which they constitutionally deserved in
return for their compelled testimony.
67. 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 418 (1899).
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Then, in 1970, Congress misinterpreted a case, which
actually broadened transactional immunity, to mean that
testimonial immunity was the only protection a witness
needed when compelled to give testimony before a grand jury.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this statute and in several short pages of opinion
wiped out a constitutionally sound immunity and replaced it
with an inadequate, impractical, and unrealistic substitute.
In Wyoming, at least in ordinary prosecutions, perhaps
the grand jury system is no longer needed. It has been of
little use in the past and it should not be used extensively in
the future unless certain fundamental changes are made.
First, a comprehensive immunity statute should be enacted
which will provide for immunity from compelled testimony
in any criminal case. But in order for Wyoming to protect
the constitutional rights of its citizens, it is imperative that
the immunity to be granted should be transactional and not
merely testimonial.
MICHAEL E. WARREN
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